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ABSTRACT
This paper contains the following results for economies with infinite dimensional
commodity spaces. (i) We establish a core-Walras equivalence theorem for
economies with an atomless measure space of agents and with an ordered separable
Banach commodity space whose positive cone has a non-empty norm interior. This
result includes as a special case the Aumann (1964) and Schmeidler-Hildenbrand,
[Hildenbrand (1974, p. 33)] finite dimensional theorems, (ii) We provide a
counterexample which shows that the above result fails in ordered Banach spaces
whose positive cone has an empty interior even if preferences are strictly
convex, monotone weakly continuous and initial endowments are strictly positive,
(iii) Using the assumption of an "extremely desirable commodity" (which is
automatically satisfied whenever preferences are monotone and the positive cone
of the commodity space has a non-empty interior) , we establish core-Walras
equivalence in any arbitrary separable Banach lattice whose positive cone may
have an empty (norm) interior.
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I . INTRODUCTION
Two of the most widely used solution concepts in economic theory are the
competitive equilibrium and the core. The first concept is usually associated
with Walras , and refers to the noncooperative allocation of resources via a
price system. The essential idea behind this concept is that when agents are
assumed to know only the price system (which they treat parametrically) and
their own preferences and endowments, then are allowed to trade freely in a
decentralized market, this process results in allocations which maximize agents'
utilities (subject to their budgets) and equate supply with demand. The second
concept is usually associated with Edgeworth, and refers to the allocation of
resources via a pure quantity bargaining process. The essential idea behind
this concept is that when agents are allowed to bargain freely (either multi- or
bilaterally) , this process leads to an allocation of resources where it is not
possible for any coalition of agents to redistribute their initial endowments
among themselves in any way that makes each member of the coalition better off.
Thus, in contrast to the competitive equilibrium, the core allows for the
possibility of cooperation among agents in the economy.
A classical conjecture about the relationship between these two concepts,
attributed to Edgeworth, is that the core shrinks to the competitive equilibrium
as the number of agents in the economy becomes large. This conjecture, often
called the Edgeworth conjecture, and indeed the notion of the core (although not
by this name) were first discussed by Edgeworth in 1881. However, the core was
not the subject of modern research until it was formally introduced in the
general (mathematical) theory of games by Gillies in 1953. Auraann (1964), in a
pathbreaking paper, reformulated rigorously the Edgeworth conjecture by showing
that in perfectly competitive economies (i.e., economies with an atomless
measure space of agents) with finitely many commodities, the core coincides with
the competitive (or Walrasian) equilibrium. Hence, in perfectly competitive
economies, core allocations completely characterize competitive equilibrium
allocations
.
The formal proof of this coincidence result has come to be known as the
core-Walras equivalence theorem. In the past two decades, many researchers have
studied this problem extensively in economies with finitely many commodities.
This research has led to very general core-Walras equivalence results and
approximate core-Walras equivalence results in economies with finitely many
commodities. However, since our goal in this paper is to study core-Walras
equivalence results in economies with infinitely many commodities , we will not
elaborate further on these finite dimensional results except where they have
particular bearing on our work. However, we do refer the reader to Anderson (1986) or
Emmons-Yannelis (1985) for a survey of this interesting literature.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the main results of our paper, it may
be useful to discuss the general importance of infinite dimensional commodity
spaces in economics. As others have observed (e.g., Court (1941), Debreu
(1954), Gabszewicz (1967), Bewley (1970), Mertens (1970) and Peleg-Yaari
(1970)), infinite dimensional commodity spaces arise very naturally in
economics. In particular, an infinite dimensional commodity space may be
desirable in problems involving an infinite time horizon, uncertainty about the
possibly infinite number of states of nature of the world, or infinite varieties
of commodity characteristics. For instance, the Lebesgue space L of bounded
measurable functions on a measure space considered by Bewley (1970) , Gabszewicz
(1968) and Mertens (1970) is useful in modeling uncertainty or an infinite time
horizon. The space L_ of square- integrable functions on a measure space
is useful in modeling the trading of
long-lived securities over time.
In this paper, we study core-Walras equivalence results for perfectly
competitive economies with an infinite dimensional commodity space which is
general enough to include all of the spaces that have been found most useful in
equilibrium analysis. The results that we obtain in this context are
three-fold:
Firstly, we prove core-Walras equivalence results for perfectly competitive
economies with an infinite dimensional commodity space whose positive cone has a
non-empty (norm) interior. Parts of this problem have been addressed by other
researchers (i.e., Gabszewicz (1968), Mertens (1970) and Bewley (1973) for the
space L ). However, since our assumptions are less restrictive than those
adopted in these previous papers , we obtain as corollaries of our results the
finite dimensional theorems of Aumann (1964) and Hildenbrand (1974, Theorem 1,
p. 133). The proof of this result is similar in spirit to that of Hildenbrand,
except that owing to the infinite dimensional setting, we appeal to results on
the integration of correspondences having values in a Banach space. The work of
Khan (1985) is especially helpful in this regard.
Secondly, in infinite dimensional commodity spaces whose positive cone has
an empty (norm) interior, we show that even under quite strong assumptions on
preferences and endowments, core-Walras equivalence fails. In particular, we
show that even when preferences are strictly convex, monotone, and weakly
continuous and initial endowments are strictly positive, core-W,ilras equivalence
fails to hold. It is interesting to note that this failure results despite the
fact that these assumptions are much stronger than the standard assumptions
which guarantee equivalence in either Aumann and Hildenbrand or our first
theorem.
Thirdly, we obtain core-Walras equivalence for infinite dimensional
commodity spaces (in particular, Banach lattices) whose positive cone may have
an empty (norm) interior and are general enough to cover the spaces L (1 < p <
°°)
. In view of the above counterexample to core-Walras equivalence in spaces
whose positive cone has an empty interior, we use the assumption of an extremely
desirable commmodity introduced in Yannelis-Zame (1986) , which in turn is
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related to the condition of uniform properness in Mas-Colell (1986) . This
assumption is essentially a bound on the marginal rates of substitution, and in
practice turns out to be quite weak. For instance it is automatically satisfied
whenever preferences are monotone and the positive cone of the commmodity space
has a non-empty (norm) interior. Hence, this assumption is implicit in any
infinite dimensional commodity space whose positive cone has a nonempty
interior, and is automatically satisfied in the finite dimensional work of
Aumann (1964) and Hildenbrand (1974) . We also wish to note that in addition to
the assumption of an extremely desirable commodity, the lattice structure of the
commodity space will play a crucial role in our analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains
notation and definitions. The economic model is outlined in Section 3. In
Section 4 we state and prove a core-Walras equivalence theorem for an ordered
separable Banach space of commodities, whose positive cone has a non-empty
(norm) interior. The failure of this result for spaces whose positive cone has
an empty interior is established in Section 5. In Section 6, we prove a
Core-Walras equivalence result for a commodity space which can be any arbitrary
separable Banach lattice, whose positive cone may have an empty (norm) interior.
Finally, some concluding remarks are given in Section 7.
2. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
2.1 Notation
R denotes the i-fold Cartesian product of the set of real numbers R.
intA denotes the interior of the set A.
A.
2 denotes the set of all nonempty subsets of the set A.
§ denotes the empty set.
/ denotes the set theoretic subtraction.
dist denotes distance.
If A C X where X is a Banach space, c^A denotes the norm closure of A.
If X is a Banach space its dual is the space X* of all continuous linear
functionals on X.
If q E X* and y E X the value of q at y is denoted by q-y.
2 .
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Definitions
Y
Let X, Y be sets. The graph of the correspondence
<f>
: X -» 2 is denoted by G =
{(x,y) e X x Y : ye<£(x)}. Let (T,r,/i) be a finite measure space, and X be a
Banach space [for a treatment of infinite dimensional vector spaces see
YAliprantis-Burkinshaw (1978, 1985)]. The correspondence
<f> : T -*• 2 is said to
have a measurable graph if G. e r <S)/3(X), where /3(X) denotes the Borel a-algebra
on X and <S> denotes product a-algebra. A function f : T -* X is called simple if
nthere exist x,
,
x~, . . . ,x in X and a. , a a in r such that f = 2 x.v
1 2 n 12 n . ., l a.1=1 l
where v (t) = 1 if t G a. and y (t) = if t € a. . A function f : T -* X isA
a. l a. l
l l
said to be xx-measurable if there exists a sequence of simple functions f : T ->
X such that limllf (t) - f (t) I = u-a.e. A tt- measurable function f : T -» X is
n
n-+<»
said to be Bochner integrable if there exists a sequence of simple functions
{ f : n=l , 2 , . . . } such that
n
lim/
T
||f
n
(t) - f(t)||d/x(t) = 0.
n->=°
In this case we define for each E G r the integral to be J" f(t)d/j(t) =
limj f (t)d/i(t). It can easily be shown (see Diestel-Uhl (1977, p. 45)) that if
Hi XT
f : T -» X is a /i-measurable function then f is Bochner integrable if and only if
J || f ( t) ||dju( t) < «5. We denote by L1 (/x,X) the space of equivalence classes of
X-valued Bochner integrable functions x : T -* X normed by |x|| = J ||x(t) ||d/i(t) .
Moreover, we denote by S the set of all X-valued Bochner integrable selections
from the correspondence
<f> : T -»• 2 , i.e.
S = {xGL
1
(/x,X) : x(t) G <f>(t) M-a.e.}.
As in Aumann (1966) , the integral of the correspondence 4> : T -» 2 is
defined as:
J
,
T
^(t)d/x(t) = {/Tx(t)d/i(t) : XGS^}.
In the sequel we will denote the above integral by
J<f> or / <j>.
3. ECONOMY, CORE AND COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
Denote by E the commodity space. Throughout this section the commodity
space E will be an ordered Banach space (see Aliprantis-Burkinshaw (1985)). We
will denote by E and E the positive and negative cones of E respectively.
An economy e is a quadruple [(T,r,/*), X, >, e] where
(1) (T,r,/i) is a measure space of agents ,
E
(2) X : T -* 2 is a consumption correspondence .
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(3) > C X(t) x X(t) is the preference relation of agent t, and
(4) e : T -+ E is the initial endowment , where e is Bochner integrable and
e(t) G X(t) for all teT.
An allocation for the economy e is a Bochner integrable function
x : T -* E . An allocation x is said to be feasible if / x(t)d)n(t) =
J e(t)d/x(t). A coalition S is an element of r such that /i(S) > 0. The
coalition S can improve upon the allocation x if there exists an allocation g
such that
(i) g(t) > x(t) n-a.e. in S, and
(ii) J
s
g(t)dM (t) = J
s
e(t)dM (t).
The set of all feasible allocations for the economy e that no coalition can
improve upon is called the core of the economy e and is denoted by C(e).
An allocation x and a price p G E \{0) are said to be a competitive
equilibrium (or a Walras equilibrium ) for the economy e , if
(i) x(t) is a maximal element of > in the budget set
(yeX(t) : p • y < p • e(t)} /x-a.e., and
(ii) Lx(t)d/*(t) = Le(t)d/i(t)
We denote by W(e) the set of all competitive equilibria for the economy e.
4. CORE-WALRAS EQUIVALENCE IN ORDERED BANACH SPACES
WHOSE POSITIVE CONE HAS A NON-EMPTY NORM INTERIOR
We begin by stating some assumptions needed for the proof of our
core-Walras equivalence result.
(a.O) E is an ordered separable Banach space whose positive cone E
has a non-empty norm interior, i.e., intE * (j).
(a.l) (Perfect Competition): (T,t,/z) is a finite atomless measure space,
(a. 2) X(t) - E for all teT.
(a. 3) The aggregate initial endowment
J* e(t)dyu(t) is strictly positive, i.e., Je » 0.
(a. 4) (Continuity): For each xeE the set {yeE : y > x) is norm
open in E for all teT.
(a. 5) > is irreflexive and transitive for all teT.
(a. 6) (Measurability) : The set {(t,y) e T x E : y > x) belongs
to r ® 0(E
+
) .
(a. 7) (Monotonicity) : If x e E and v e E \{0), then x + v > x for all
teT.
We are now ready to state our first result. We wish to note that this
result for E = C(X)
,
(where C(X) denotes the space of continuous functions on a
compact metric space X) was first proved by Gabszewicz , and it is attributed to
him.
Theorem 4.1; Under assumptions (a.O) - (a. 7), C(e) = W(e)
Remark 4.1 : Note that the assumptions of the above theorem correspond to
those in Aumann (1964) in the setting of an ordered separable Banach space E of
commodities. It can easily be seen that for E = R
,
Theorem 4.1 gives as a
corollary Aumann' s (1964) core equivalence result, (as well as Hildenbrand'
s
(1974, Theorem 1, p. 133)) core-Walras equivalence theorem). It may be
instructive at this point to note that Bewley's (1973) infinite dimensional
extension of Aumann' s core equivalence theorem does not provide the above
results as a corollary because it is based on stronger assumptions than those
adopted by Aumann and Hildenbrand.
4. 1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
The fact that W(e) c C(e) is well known, and therefore its proof is not
repeated here. We begin the proof by assuming that the allocation x is an
element of the core of e . We wish to show that for some price p, the pair (x,p)
is a competitive equilibrium for e
.
E
To this end, define the correspondence
<f> : T -» 2 by
(4.0) 4>(t) = {zeE
+
: z >
t
x(t) }u{e(t) } .
We claim that:
(4.1) cHlT 4> - JT e) n int E_= <(>,
or equivalently
,
(4.2) (J 4> - /_ e) n int E - $.
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Suppose otherwise, i.e.,
(JT 4>
- JT
e) n int E_* (|)
then there exists v e int E such that
(4.3) Je - v e J>.
It follows from (4.3) that there exists a function y : T -» E such that
(4.4) JT y
= JT
e - v,
and y(t) e <^(t) /z-a.e.
Let
S = {t : y(t) > x(t)} , and
S' = {t : y(t) = e(t)}.
Since J y * J e we have that /x(S) > 0. Define y : S -» E by y(t) = y(t) +
for all t e S. By monotonicity (assumption (a. 7)) y(t) > y(t) . Since
v
fJL(S)
y(t) > x(t) for all t e S, by transitivity (assumption (a. 5)) y(t) > x(t) for
all t e S. Moreover, it can be easily seen that y(-) is feasible for the
coalition S , i.e
.
,
J
s
y = /s y + v = ;T y - Js ,e + v
= /T e - Js , e = Js e, (recall (4.4)).
Therefore, we have found an allocation y(
•
) which is feasible for the coalition
S and is also preferred to the allocation x, which in turn was assumed to be in
the core of e , a contradicton which establishes the validity of (4.1).
We may now separate the set ci(JV - Je) - ciJV - Je from int E . Clearly
the set int E is convex and non-empty. We wish to show that cij^> - Je is
11
convex and non-empty as well. Observe first that by the definition of <£(•) ,
is an element of f<f> - Je and this shows that c£j<j> - Je is non-empty. Since,
(T,T,/i) is atomless (assumption (a.l)) by Theorem 1 in Khan (1985) or Theorem
4.2 in Hiai-Umegaki (1977), cij*<£ is convex. Thus, by Theorem 9.10 in
Aliprantis-Burkinshaw (1985, p. 136) there exists a continuous linear functional
peE\{0), p > such that
(4.5) p • y > p • Je for all yeJ<j>
.
Since by assumption (a. 6), > has a measurable graph, so does <f> , i.e.,
G,G r ® £(E ). Therefore, it follows from Theorem 2 . 2 in Hiai-Umegaki (1977)
+
that
(4.6) inf p • y = J inf p • z > J" p • e.
yej> ze<j>
It follows from (4.6) that
(4.7) ji-a.e. p • z > p • e(t) for all z > x(t) .
To see this, suppose that for ze <£(•), p • z<p • e(t) for all t E S,
M(S) > 0.
Define the function z : T -* E by
z(t) if t G S
e(t) if t
€
S.
Obviously, z e <£(•) . Moreover,
;T
p. s = ;
s
P • z + ;TXS P
. e
K h P ' e + ^T\S P ' e = / P
a contradiction to (4.6).
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We now show that /i-a.e. p • x(t) = p • e(t). First note that it follows
directly from (4.7) that p • x(t) > p • e(t) yu-a.e. If now p • x(t) > p • e(t)
for all t e S, /i(S) > then,
p • ;T
x = P • ;TXS
x + P • ;s
x
> P • ;TXS
e + P • ;s
e = P • ;T
e,
contradicting J x = / e, since p > 0, p ^ 0.
To complete the proof we must show that x(t) is maximal in the budget set
[z G E : p • z < p • e(t)} /x-a.e. The argument is now routine. Since j_ e is
strictly positive (assumption (a. 3)) it follows that /i({t : p • e(t)}) > 0, for
if p • e(t) = fi-a.e. then p • J e = contradicting the fact that J e is
strictly positive since p > 0, p ^ 0.
Thus, we can safely pick an agent t with positive income, i.e.
,
p • e(t) >
0. Since p • e(t) > there exists an allocation x' such that p • x' < p -e(t).
Let y be such that p • y < p • e(t) and let y(A) = Ax' + (l-A)y for A E (0,1).
Then for any Ae(0,l), p • y(A) < p • e(t) and by (4.7) y(A) f x(t) . It foil
from the norm continuity of > (assumption (a. 4)) that y ^ x(t) . This proves
that x(t) is maximal in the budget set of agent t, i.e., {w : p • w < p • e(t)}
This, together with the monotonicity of preferences (assumption (a. 7)) implies
that prices are strictly positive, i.e., p » 0. Indeed, if there exists
v 6 E \(0) such that p • v = then p • ( x(t) + v ) = p • x(t) = p • e(t) and
by monotonicity x(t) + v > x(t) contradicting the maximality of x(t) in the
budget set.
Thus p » and x(t) is maximal in the budget set whenever p • e(t) > 0.
Consider now an agent t with zero income, i.e., p • e(t) = 0. Since p »
ows
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his/her budget set {z : p • z = 0} consists of zero only, and moreover,
p • x(t) = p • e(t) = 0. Hence, x(t) = for almost all t £ T, with p • e(t) =
0; i.e., zero in this case is the maximal element in the budget set.
Consequently, (p,x) is a competitive equilibrium for e, and this completes the
proof of Theorem 4.1.
5. THE FAILURE OF THE CORE-WALRAS EQUIVALENCE IN COMMODITY
SPACES WHOSE POSITIVE CONE HAS AN EMPTY INTERIOR
In the previous section we showed that if the commodity space is an ordered
separable Banach space E whose positive cone has a non-empty norm interior
(i.e.,intE ^ (J>) , then the standard assumptions (i.e., the assumptions of
Theorem 4.1) guarantee core-Walras equivalence. We now show that if the
assumption that the positive cone of the space E has a non-empty norm interior
is dropped, then Theorem 4.1 fails. The following example will illustrate this.
Example 5.1 : Consider the economy e = [(T,r,/x), X, >, e] where,
(1) the space of agents is T = [0,1], r = Lebesgue measurable sets,
H = Lebesgue measure
,
(2) the consumption set of each agent is, X(t) = i 9 for all teT,
where 2^ is the space of real sequences (a ) for which the norm
ii ii ^ _, i 2 . 1/2 . _
.
a = (S a ) ' is finite,
(3) the preference relation of each agent > , is represented by a
strictly concave, monotone weakly continuous utility function,
14
00
-2 2
i.e., u (x) - S i (l-exp(-i x.)) for all teT, and
t i=l
L
1
00
(4) the initial endowment of each agent is e(t) = e = (—r) ._. for all teT.
i
We will show that for the above economy, C(e) ^ (j) and W(e) = (j). In
particular, we will show that the core of e is unique and consists of the
initial endowment e, i.e., C(e) = {e} and W(e) = ((). The latter (i.e., W(e) = <j))
will easily follow from the fact that C(e) = {e}. Indeed, since W(e) c C.(e),
W(e) c {{e}, (J)}, but the only candidate as a supporting price p for the
allocation e are multiples of p = (1,1,...) which are not in the dual of J>
Hence, all we need to show is that C(e) = {e}.
To prove that C(e) = {e} we will first need to show that e is Pareto
optimal, i.e., there does not exist a feasible allocation x such that
u(x(t)) > u(e) for all teT and u(x(t)) > u(e) for all t e S, S c T, /i(S) >
(note that the subscript t on u is dropped) . To this end suppose by way of
contradiction that there exists an allocation x such that J x = J e = e,
u(x(t)) > u(e) for all teT and u(x(t)) > u(e) for all t e S, /i(S) > 0.
Without loss of generality we may assume that there exist positive real numbers
v, S, with u(x(t)) > u(e) + u, t e S, jz(S) = 8. Extend x to x defined on the
interval [0,1] as x(t) = x(t-[t]), ([t] = the integer part of t) , and let
. k-1 -. i.
x
k (t) = S X(t+kV •
i=0
K
Then
k-1 -
i
/J u(x
k (t))d^(t) = /J u( S
X(t+
k } /k )di"(t)
k-1 i
> J
L
S
L/ u(x(t+-))d/x(t)
U
i=0
R R
(5.1) = /J u(x(t))d/i(t) > u(e) + uS.
15
k k
Notice that each coordinate of x (•)• denoted by x.(-) (an L- [0,1] function),
k-1- i
converges to e. /x-a.e. (indeed in L
1 ) ,
so x.(t) = S k /, -» Jnx. (s)d/z(s) =
1=0 k->«>
e. for almost all t in T; so x (t) converges weakly in J* to e. Since u is
weakly continuous it follows that u(x (t)) -» u(e) /i-a.e. Notice that by
2
K
definition, u is bounded. In particular, u(x) < 7— for every x G i (recall the
b L
definition of u(
•
) in (3)) and therefore by the Lebesgue dominated convergence;k f\ k r
n
u(x (t))d^i(t) = J n lim u(x (t))d^i(t) = u(e) = u(Je), a
k-^oo k-+<»
contradiction to (5.1). Thus, e is Pareto optimal.
We are now ready to complete the proof of the fact that C(e) = {e}. To
this end we first show that:
(5.2) C(0 C {e}.
Suppose that (5.2) is false, then there exists an allocation x G C(e) such that
~ x~t~e ~
x(t) * e for all t G S, /x(S) > 0. Let x = . Then x is feasible and for all
2
t G T,
1 1
u(x(t)) > - u(x(t)) + - u(e)
> u(e) (recall that u(x(t)) > u(e) for all t gT since x G C(e)).
Moreover, by strict concavity of u(
•
) we have that
u(x(t)) > u(e) for all t G S,
a contradiction to the fact that e is Pareto optimal.
We now show that
:
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(5.3) {e} c C(«).
Suppose that (5.3) is false, then there exists a coalition S and an
allocation x such that J x = J e and u(x(t)) > u(e) for all t G S. Define the
allocation x(
•
) as follows:
x(t) if t e S
e(t) if t
€
S
Then u(x(t)) > u(e) for all t e T and u(x(t)) > u(e) for all t e S,
contradicting the fact that e is Pareto optimal.
It follows from (5.2) and (5.3) that C(e) = {e} and this completes the
proof of the fact that C(e) *
(J)
and wCO = (fl -
Since example 5.1 satisfies all the conditions of Theorem 4.1 except
assumption (a.O) (note that inti- = (f>) , we can conclude that if positive results
are to be obtained in spaces whose positive cone has an empty norm interior some
additional assumption needs to be imposed. The additional assumption we impose
is that of an extremely desirable commodity introduced in Yannelis-Zame (1986),
(which is related to the assumption of proper preferences introduced by
Mas-Colell (1986)).
6. CORE-WALRAS EQUIVALENCE IN SEPARABLE BANACH LATTICES
WHOSE POSITIVE CONE HAS AN EMPTY INTERIOR
We begin by defining the notion of an extremely desirable commodity. Let E
be a Banach lattice and denote its positive cone (which may have an empty norm
17
interior) by E . Let v s E , v ^ 0. We say that v e E is an extremely
desirable commodity if there exists an open neighborhood U such that for each x
G E and each t G T, we have that x + av - z > x whenever a > 0. z < x + qv and
+ t
z G aU. In other words, v is extremely desirable if an agent would prefer to
trade any commodity bundle z for an additional increment of the commodity bundle
v, provided that the size of z is sufficiently small compared to the increment
of v. The above notion has a natural geometric interpretation. In particular,
let vgE
,
v^O, Ubean open neighborhood and define the open cone C as
follows
:
C= {qv- z : a>0, zGE, z G aU }
.
The bundle v is said to be an extremely desirable commodity, if for each x G E
,
and each tGT we have y > x whenever y is an element of (C + x) n E . This
implies that v is an extremely desirable commodity if for each x G E we have
that ((-C + x) n E ) n {y : y > x} = $ , or equivalently -C n {y - x G E :
y >
t
x} = <|>.
Recall that if the preference relation > is monotone and intE ^ (J), then
the assumption of an extremely desirable commodity is automatically satisfied
(see for instance Yannelis-Zame (1986)).
We now state our assumptions:
(a. 8) E is any separable Banach lattice.
(a. 9) (Extremely desirable commodity): Let v G E /{0} and U be an open
convex neighborhood. Let C be the cone spanned by v + U. The
bundle v is said to be an extremely desirable commodity with respect
18
to U, if for each x G E and each t G T, we have y > x whenever y
is an element of (C + x) n E
+
n
Let 8., i=l,...,n be positive real numbers with 2 8 .=1
l r , - l1=1
(a. 10) Let U of (a. 9) satisfy the following condition: if x. G E
,
n n
x. G 5.U, 1-1,2,... ,n then 2 x. G 2 S.U = U.
l l . - i . - ii=l 1=1
We note that in assumption (a. 10) the additivity condition only concerns
the neighborhood of the extremely desirable commodity, not the commodity space.
To clarify this point we shall consider a specific example. Consider the space
L (Q) , 1 < p < « where Q is a finite separable measure space. From Holder's
inequality, for f G L (Q) we have that |f||,^ C||f|| for some constant C depending
only on p and Cl. Suppose now that assumption (a. 9) is satisfied with U
containing a neighborhood U' of the form:
U' = {f G L
p
: [fl^ < «}.
Then U' is open in L because of the inequality mentioned above. Moreover
(a. 10) is also satisfied. Roughly speaking we require the neighborhood U' of
the extremely desirabe commodity to be "large" in the topology of E.
Finally we need:
(a. 11) For each x G E , the sets {y G E : y > x} and {y G E : x > y}
are norm open in E for all t G T.
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We can now state the following result.
Theorem 6.1 : Under assumptions (a.l) - (a. 11), C(e) = W(e).
Proof : It can be easily shown that W(e) c C(e). Hence, we will show that if
x e C(e) then for some price p, the pair (x,p) is a competitive equilibrium
for e .
Define the correspondence
<f> : T -» 2 + by
(6.1) <f>(t) = {z e E
+
: z >
t
x(t)} u (e(t)}.
Let C be the open cone spanned by the set v + U given by assumptions (a. 9)-
(a.10), i.e., C= span {0 , v + U) = u a(v + U) . We claim that:
a>0
(6.2) ci(J> - Je) n -C - $
or equivalently
(6.3) (J<f> - Je) n -C = (().
Since -C is open it suffices to show that for any y G S there exists a sequence
-k -k
-k
{ (y , e ) : k—1,2,...} in L.(/i,E) x L (/j,E) such that y converges in the L.(/i,E)
norm to y, Je -* Je, and
(6-4) JTy
k
- /Te
k
€ -C.
Let S = {t : y(t) > x(t)}, S' = T/S . Without loss of generality we may assume
that ji(S) > 0, (for if /x(S) = then y(t) - e(t) /z-a.e. which implies that fy -
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Je = £ -C. Consequently (6.3) holds). In the argument below y and e are
restricted to S. Moreover, denote by /z the restriction of y. to S.
Since, y : S -»• E is Bochner integrable and > is norm continuous (assumption
k k k k k k
(a. 11) ) there exist y n y in E and T- , T , . . . ,T in r such that y1 m, + l L m,
converges in the L..(/x ,E) norm to y, and
k "He k(6.5) y = E
k
y v k
1=1 l
k k
(6.6) y. > x(t) for all t e T. and all i, i=l m, , and
(6.7) tz (T.) = £, i=l,...,m, , (where | is a real positive number).
k
mk r
Let e = S (J e(t)d/i(t)) y *
i=l TR i
l
Claim 6.8: f y
k
-
J* e
k
^ -C
Assume that Claim 6.8 holds (a proof is given at the end of this Section). We
-k -k -k
can now construct the sequence { (y , e ) : k=l, 2 ,...}. In particular, define y
: T - E by
y (t) H
f k
y (t) if t e S
y(t) if t
€
S
-k
Similarly define e : T - E by
e (t)
e (t) if t G S
e(t) if t
€
S.
-k -k
Note that J y - J e ^ -C and therefore (6.4) holds
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We can now separate the convex nonempty set c$.]4> - Je from the convex nonempty
set -C, proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Claim 6.8 : We will argue by contradiction, and for notational
convenience we will drop the index k.
Suppose that Claim 6.8 is false, then
m m
2 y.£ - 2 e. £ G - a(v + U) , and therefore
i=l
L
i=l
L
m m
(6.9) 2 y. + w - u = 2 e.
,
. ,
i
,
,
i
i-1 i=l
where w = - v, ue^U.
Note that without loss of generality we may assume that u >
,
(otherwise
A + A
since u - u - u
,
we may define y. = y. + -. Then y. > and u G aU, f recallJ J l J l m ; i ' v.
A
that U can be assumed to be solid ^ , y. > x(t) for all t G T. and all i and one
A
can proceed by substituting y. for y.)-
It follows from (6.9) that for any m-tuple (0..
,
. . .
,
9 ) , 9 . > (i=l ,m) ,
1 mi
m m
£ 9. = 1 we have that 2 (y. + 0.w) - u = 2 e. > 0, and therefore
1=1 1=1 1=1
m
(6.10) u < 2 (y. + 0.w)
.
1=1
Applying the Riesz Decomposition Property in (6.10) we obtain u- , . .
.
,u in E
such that
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m
(6.11) 2 u. = u, u. < y. - 0.w for all i.
. . l l J l li=l
(It is easy to see that the proof of the Riesz Decomposition Property provides
an algorithm to choose in a unique way the u.'s above).
For each i, define y. : [0,1] -* E by y.(0) = y. + 6 .w - u. . Moreover, for each
m
i set F.(y.(0)) = dist (y.(0), C + y.) = 8.(8). Let A = {q e R
m
: 2 q. = 1}
.
i=l
(
*i
+ 5
i }
Define the continuous mapping f : A » A by f(J) »/ j . - . By
m '
1 + 2 6.
j-i J
Brouwer's fixed point theorem, there exists 0*e A such that 9* = f (0*) , i.e.,
*
m
(6.12) 8. = . 2 6., i=l, . .
.
,m.
j-l
m
If we show that H. = then by the definition of F.
,
y.(0 ) G ci(C + y.) n E
j-l
and by continuity (assumption (a. 11)) and the assumption of an extremely
— it
desirable commodity (assumption (a. 9)) y.(0 ) ^ y. for all t £ T. , and all i.
—
&
Moreover, since y. > x(t) for all t G T. and for all i by transitivity y.(d )
m
- *
m
> x(t) for all t e T. and for all i. Also £2 v. (ft ) = £ e.f = /e . Define
L
i-1 ' i=l
L
m
- *
y = 2 y. (0 )xT and note that J* y = J e. Therefore we have found an allocation
i-1 i
y(
•
) which is feasible for the coalition S and preferred to x(-) which in turn
was assumed to be in the core of e , a contradiction. Consequently, we conclude
m
that Claim 6.8 holds. Hence, all that remains to be shown is that 2 8. =0.
j-i j
m
To this end suppose tha t 2 8. > 0. Notice that by (6.12) we have that 6.
J-l J
= if and only if 8 . = 0. Define J, Kc I = {1,2 m) as follows:
23
J = (i 6 I : 6.= 0), K = I\J. Note that J= (I € I : 6. = 0}. Consider any i e
_ - *
J; then by the definition of y.(-) we have that y.(9 ) =y. - u.. Now if
u. * 0, by monotonicity y. > y.(d ) and by virtue of continuity and extreme
desirability we can conclude that y.(0 ) e ci(C + y.). By the definition of F.
,
8. > 0, a contradiction to the fact that i e J. Hence, u. = for i e J and so
1 i
(6.13) Z u. = Z u. = u.
l liel ieK
Consider any ieK, i.e., 8. > 0, then by the definition of F. , it follows
that y.(0 ) =y. + 0.w - u. e C + y. for every ieK, and therefore,y i y i l l J l J
#.w - u. e C for all ieK which in turn implies that u. e 0. t U for all i € K.11 r l l £
*
a
It follows from (6.13), the fact that u.£ 6. - U for all ieK,
2 0, - 1 and assumption (a. 10) that 2 u. = £ u. = u e j U, which contradicts
ieK iel 1 ieK L *
m
(6.9), (i.e., u e -. U) . The above contradiction establishes that 2 5 . = and
K j=l J
this completes the proof of Claim 6.8.
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Remark 7.1 : The separability condition on our commodity space E was used in the
proof of Theorems 4.1 and 6.1 at one point only. In particular, it was used to
make the result of Hiai-Umegaki (1977) or Hildenbrand (1974, Proposition 6, p.
63) applicable - note that Hildenbrand' s argument remains valid for
correspondences taking values in a separable metric space -, (recall (4.6)).
This result is proved via the measurable selection theorem, which requires
separability of the range of the correspondence.
Remark 7.2 : Bewley (1973) and Mertens (1970) have proved a core-Walras
equivalence theorem for a commodity space, which is L . Their assumptions on
preferences and endowments are stronger than the ones used in the present paper.
It is worth noting that Bewley and Mertens, both endow L with the Mackey
topology (L
,
Mackey) , and they are in a setting of a separable space whose
positive cone has an empty interior. Consequently, Bewley and Mertens may be
considered as predecessors of Theorem 6.1 (of course without using the extreme
desirability assumption in the Mackey sense)
.
Remark 7.3 : Subsequent to the writing of the present paper, Cheng (1987) and
Zame (1987), following the coalitional approach of Vind-(1964) , Richter (1971)
and Armstrong-Richter (1985), have obtained core-Walras equivalence theorems.
Although their results are not directly comparable with ours, it appears that
our assumptions on preferences are weaker than theirs.
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Remark 7.4 : We now indicate how our methods can cover the space m(f2), used by
Mas-Colell (1975). Specifically, Mas-Colell considers as commodity spaces the set of bounded,
signed (Borel) measures on H, denoted by m(Q). He endows m(Q) with the weak* topology.
Note the weak* topology on norm bounded subsets of ra(H) is separable and metrizable.
Since preferences are also endowed with the weak* topology in order to obtain the counter-
part of Theorem 6.1, one needs to work with allocations which are Gelfand integrable func-
tions (see Khan (1985), for a definition). The argument used to prove Theorem 6.1 remains
unchanged, provided that one uses the fact that the weak * closure of the Gelfand integral of
correspondence (5.1) is convex [see Khan (1985, Claim 3, p. 265)], and by noting that since we
are in a setting of a locally convex, separable and metrizable linear topological space, the
measurable selection theorem is applicable and therefore the counterpart of Hiai-Umegaki
(1977), theorem for the Gelfand integral holds as well. Ostroy and Zame (1988) have pro-
vided a related argument.
Remark 7.5: It is worth pointing out that as is Aumann (1964) under the assumptions of
either Theorem 4.1 or 6.1 both the Walrasian Equilibrium and the core may be empty. It
should also be mentioned that there is no convexification effect on aggregation, i.e., the aggre-
gate demand set is not necessarily convex [recall that the Lyapunov theorem fails in infinite
dimensional spaces, it is only approximately true and so is the Fatou Lemma, see, for instance,
Yannelis (1988, 1989) and Rustichini (1989).] However, recently Rustichini-Yannelis (1988)
have shown that one can still have the convexifying effect on aggregation provided that the
economy have "many more agents than commodities", i.e., the dimension of the measure space
of agents in bigger than the dimension of the commodity space. The concept of dimension has
of course to be given a rigorous formulation.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Recently, substantial progress has been made in establishing existence
results for the competitive equilibrium in exchange economies with finitely
many agents and with a commodity space which is general enough to encompass
all the spaces mentioned above, (see for instance Mas-Colell (1986) or
Yannelis-Zame (1986) among others). Moreover, some progess has been made in
obtaining equilibrium existence results for perfectly competitive economies,
i.e., economies with an atomless measure space of agents a la Aumann (1966)
and with an infinite dimensional commodity space (see for instance,
Khan-Yannelis (1986), Yannelis (1987), and Zame (1987)). However, the core
has received significantly less attention in infinite dimensional settings.
2. It should be noted that a precursor of the assumption of uniform
properness is in Chichilnisky-Kalman (1980). In particular, in order to
apply Hahn-Banach- type separation theorems in spaces whose positive cone has
an empty interior, they introduced a related assumption with that of uniform
properness used by Mas-Colell.
3. > is defined to be the asymmetric part of the weak preference relation >,
i.e. , we say that x > y if and only if x > y and not y > x. This is not
needed for Theorem 4.1. However, it is used in the proof of Theorem 6.1.
4. We will say that an element x of E is strictly positive (and write x » 0)
if II-x > whenever II is a positive non-zero element of E .
5. This is so since intE is an open set. In particular, if A and B are
subsets of any topological space and B is open, then it can be easily seen
that AnB = cf) if and only if ciAnB = $.
R-l
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